CO129-502-6 China- general situation 7-1-1927 - 3-3-1927 — Page 178

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. January 1927.

SECRET

759-B.

(Also Papers Nos. C.O.S.-60 and C.P. 8 (27).

COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.

Copy No. 18

THE SITUATION AT CANTON, JANUARY 1927.

(Previous C.I.D. Papers Nos. 617-B, 677–B, 681–B, 722–B, 727-B, 750-B and 756-B.)

Report by the Chiefs of Staff.

THE Chiefs of Staff Committee were directed by the Prime Minister to meet to consider the telegram from the General Officer Commanding, Hong Kong, to the War Office, No. 1279, dated the 13th January, 1927 (Appendix 1), in which is raised the question of the evacuation of Shameen. We met at short notice on the afternoon of Friday, the 14th January, 1927. Sir Victor Wellesley, of the Foreign Office, was present for the whole, and Sir Gilbert Grindle and Mr. Clutterbuck, of the Colonial Office, for a part of our meeting.

2. Sir Victor Wellesley brought to our attention telegram No. 5 from the Acting British Consul-General, Canton, dated the 13th January, 1927 (Appendix II), which is closely connected with the telegram from the General Officer Commanding referred to above, and which we have therefore also taken into consideration. These telegrams. raise the issue of whether, in the circumstances now prevailing, the British and French Concessions in Shameen and Canton are to be evacuated or held, and what should be the instructions to the local authorities on this point.

3. We dealt with the smaller Concessions generally in our recent Report on the Situation in China (C.O.S.-59, dated 11th January). We there pointed out (para- graph 7) "that the protection of the smaller Concessions must, as indicated in our first Report (C.I.D. Paper No. 617-B), devolve upon the Naval Forces.

The Navy, however, cannot, as a general rule, do more than afford protection against mob violence. If it is a question of dealing with organised military forces, evacuation will usually be the only course.

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4. These principles apply generally to the case of Shameen, but there are certain points which differentiate it from most of the other Concessions. Firstly, it is situated on an island in the river, separated by a narrow creek from the mainland; but, as the creek is usually crowded with small craft, its importance as a military obstacle is less than appears at first sight, unless these vessels are cleared away before events are precipitated. Secondly, Shameen is so near to Hong Kong that troops can easily be sent up, and this course has been followed in the past. Other special considerations are set forth in the following Conclusions of the Memorandum by the General Staff attached to C.I.D. Paper No. 722-B, which we quoted in paragraph 10 of our last Report -

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(a.) Any action taken with regard to Shameen, which involves military consequences, will have to be taken in co-operation with, and with the prior agreement of, the French, who have a definite share in the foreign concession.

"(b.) The evacuation of Shameen will almost certainly involve its looting and possibly its destruction by the Cantonese.

"(c.) The institution of a blockade without the evacuation of Shameen will almost certainly produce a demand for military protection. If this demand is to be met, a garrison of two companies of infantry, with machine guns, and two sections of pack artillery is considered the minimum that could safeguard itself and also the concession.

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